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THE IMPACT OF THE RULE OF LAW ON
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
OF SECURITIES MARKETS
By
Larry Alan Bear and
Rita Maldonado-Bear*
…a major asset of our nation (is) the integrity of our financial
system.
Trust is a principle of central importance to all effective financial
systems.  Our system is strong and vibrant in large part because
we demand that financial institutions participating in our markets
operate with integrity…When confidence in the integrity of a
financial institution is shaken, or its commitment to the honest
conduct of business is in doubt, public trust erodes and the entire
system is weakened.
– Alan Greenspan1
*Both of the Stern School of Business of New York University
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INTRODUCTION
Most people with an interest in the securities markets/law interrelationship have tended to
confuse ends and means with regard to the two principal laws pertaining to the issuance of, and
trade in, securities.2
The overriding END of all securities regulation is to promote the public trust in, and
resulting firm commitment to, financial markets.  The consequence of achieving that goal is that
these markets can then grow and prosper as a fundamental pillar of our democratic capitalist
society.
Promoting transparency, safety and stability and fairness in securities markets are
important means to that end; i.e., through registration, anti-fraud provisions and the like.
The ends-means distinction is significant.  A concentrated focus on specific portions of
the law, such as the registration process, exempt transactions, private placements, tender offers
and anti-fraud, can cloud the actual goal.  This is key to understanding the law/professional
responsibility interface in securities markets.  Of course, public trust and participation cannot be
the responsibility of law alone.  Nourishing public trust is the responsibility of market
professionals as well–and of regulators, surely.3
It should be mentioned here, in the face of a very long bull market run, that the illusion of
endless profits may seem to lessen the importance of promoting the public trust.  However, when
the inevitable downturn arrives–in whatever quantitative form–there will be no ingredient more
important in promoting the resuscitation and growth of securities markets.
We would argue that the remarkable increase in law and regulation over the past several
years in the securities markets area has had the preservation of public trust foremost in mind.
We will detail some of that activity in this paper.
In Section I we will emphasize the importance of understanding the basics of the United
States Rule of Law.  The time is long past when either economists or lawyers, on the basis of
their own singular disciplinary focus, could hope to understand, much less help shape, efficient,
growth promoting market/law activity at the legislative, regulatory or judicial levels.  All
competitive markets/law interfaces are interdisciplinary, and can be understood only by focusing
on the fundamental underpinnings of both professions.
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I. The Rule of Law in the United States
There is no way to begin any discussion of the Rule of Law in the United States other
than at its beginning.  And that beginning is our Constitution.  An extraordinary written
Constitution it surely is, not because it has been the basis for many other constitutions around the
world, but because it has actually worked in practice since its ratification on July 2, 1788.  That a
singular written document has provided, for more than 200 years, the basis for an unwavering
Rule of Law in a vast nation which has seen incomparable growth in developed land mass,
population and commerce, is nothing short of incredible.
No one in fact can, with unquestioned authority, explain exactly why our Constitution has
continued to play the central role, successfully, in what surely is the longest run of a free,
democratic republic in the history of the world.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the answer to the durability of our Constitution
might lie beyond its establishment of a tri-partite system of g vernment with power divided
between legislative, executive and judicial branches.  That system is surely a remarkably
effective means to an important end, but only a means, nevertheless.
We cannot go into detail here regarding the structure and function of our legal system.4
We will focus only on the relationship between our Constitutional value system and its allied
“common law” process.
In this system and process lies the basis for understanding the development and meaning
of our securities (and other) laws and their impact on both the strength, and required ethical
behavior, of our financial institutions.
We begin our brief focus on the Constitution by suggesting that none of its system
structures; i.e., separation of powers, delineation of specific governing powers within institutions
and the like are the end focus of the document.  Structures are mandated because institutions
must exist to nourish both structure and process.  But we, the People, are kept secure by these
institutions through their focus on the Constitution’s goal: o ensure the permanence of the values
by which the citizens of the 13 new states chose, and all succeeding generations have chosen, to
live their lives.
The Constitution of the United States of America came into existence as we know it,
because free citizens themselves had a hand in choosing the values it was meant to emphasize.
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The Constitution, as presented to the people by the original framers, was simply NOT
acceptable to the colonial majority.  Rhode Island, for example, rejected it by a popular
referendum vote, 2,708 to 237.  Patrick Henry came within a heartbeat of defeating its
acceptance by Virginia.  James Madison had to save it there by agreeing to recommend a Bill of
Rights to be added to the document.  The Constitution faced defeat in Massachusetts as well,
passing in the end only by dint of an agreement by the Federalists to fight for 9 amendments.
The New Hampshire convention demanded amendments as well.5
No governmental institutions or processes, by themselves, could persuade the necessary
number of citizens to give themselves over to a powerful central government.  They had just
thrown off the yoke of one across the sea, and at considerable personal cost.  For them, the very
purpose of a Constitutional structure was to protect the values by which their continued liberty
could be assured.  The basic values were spelled out in what we now know as The Bill of Rights,
formally ratified and made an integral part of the United States Constitution on December 15,
1791.
We Americans understand that the right to contract and the sanctity of contracts are a
bedrock of our socio-economic system.  We would argue that implicit in the fierce and
democratic struggle of the people, over the ultimate values to be placed in, and protected by,
their constitution, was the implicit agreement that if those values were there in the document,
then, upon ratification, all citizens would be bound by that Constitution utterly.
The Constitution of the United States was indeed the Mother of all contracts then, and
still is now, for all of us.  We suggest that it was the acceptance of that contract by the people
that gave it not just its structure, but its strength and durability as well.
Of course, the values by which free men and women have chosen to live their lives, are
not immutable, even though they are permanent at base.
Due process, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, separation of church and state, the
writ of habeas corpus–these and other rights/values in the Constitution do not change, and cannot
be done away with if we intend to remain a free Republic.  However, the practical, workable
shape these values assume, and how they are both protected and enforced is determined still, by a
free, democratic citizenry in succeeding generations under changing conditions.  The permanent
struggle to give contemporary, yet lasting, meaning to our Constitution is the basis of citizen
concern with what nine Justices on the United States Supreme Court do.  The Justices must rely,
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of course, on their own learning, skills and legal perceptions; however, to believe that they, too,
are not influenced in any way by the will of the people is, to say the least, ingenuous.
The values set forth in the Constitution, as re-interpreted, but never rejected by the
citizenry in succeeding generations,6 are the foundation upon which our society is built, and by
means of which it functions as it does.  And property rights, the freedom to contract and access
to an independent judiciary are examples of the fulfillment of these values.  Upholding these
values is an obligation, and our financial institutions, no less than the citizenry in general, are
bound to meet that obligation or risk turning the Constitution into merely pieces of paper.
That situation has been the lot of many nations around the world who have had several
incarnations of such pieces of paper, without ever effecting through them a value system capable
of producing and sustaining a Rule of Law.  To the great detriment of their financial systems,
one might add–to name but a single consequence of functioning without a Rule of Law.
The Rule of Law in a Constitutional Democracy must function as the Constitution does:
its practical, workable shape must be subject to change under changing conditions.  The end of
the Rule of Law being always to strengthen and uphold the values inherent in the original
contract–by assuring that we and our institutions, including the financial, fulfill our obligations
to uphold those values as well.
Our Rule of Law functions through a process remarkably well suited to the task.  That
process is “The Common Law.”
The common law system originated in England and was adopted in the United States.
The majority of western nations utilize a different legal process, based upon a comprehensive set
of written statutes referred to collectively as a Civil Law Code.  The answers to legal questions
must proceed from what is within the Code, not from outside it.  The individual statutes can be
changed.  But until they are, they govern all cases.
Our common law is different.  It is generally derived from principles rather than
rules; it does not consist of absolute, fixed and inflexible rules, but rather of
broad and comprehensible principles based on justice, reason and common sense.
Its principles have been determined by the social needs of the community and
have changed with changes in such needs.  These principles are susceptible to
new conditions, interests, relations and usages as the progress of society may
require.7
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The common law, in actuality, is neither loose nor unduly broad for reasons we will soon
detail.  However, it is certainly more changeable than is civil law.  Free, competitive market
managers in the United States neglect that reality at their peril, s w  hope to demonstrate in
Section II.
Judges do make the common law.  But they must observe two very important
requirements while doing so:
1. They must honor “stare decisis” which means literally that they must honor the laws
that have already been laid down in very similar cases.  But “stare decisis” is not
inviolable.  What judges who wish to depart from precedent must do is elucidate very
carefully good cause to repudiate it.  But they are subject to reversal by a higher
(appellate) court.
2. Judges must reduce all their opinions to writing, so that they are on the record as to
reasoning and result.  At the trial level, there is a complete trial transcript; at the
appellate level, all opinions are printed and available for reading in law libraries and,
most recently, on the Internet.
These two requirements assure a satisfactory measure of stability in the law so that
people and organizations might have guidance on how to act in legally-related situations.
There are plenty of statutes passed in the United States at the Federal and State level.
And allied regulations, too.  Nevertheless, our basic body of law is common law based, and the
principle of incorporating change when necessary permeates our legal process.
Only Congress can create federal law.  And since the Congress could not possibly deal
with every request for bank mergers, or drug releases, or spectrum licenses or whatever, nor
maintain oversight over all industries, it passes legislation appointing administrative agencies to
do so (“enabling legislation”).  This legislation, to put it succinctly, sets out priorities and ground
rules.  The administrative agency then fleshes them out.8
For example, the Federal Reserve must obey the ground rules for granting or denying a
bank holding company the right to engage in a new business.  One requirement set out by the
Congress in such a case is that the new activity be “so closely related to banking...as to be a
proper incident thereto.9  Exactly what does that mean in any individual case?  What the Federal
Reserve says it means, within limits, of course.10
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If the agency is alleged to have exceeded its authority; i.e., made a decision not “enabled”
by the congressional statutes, they can be taken to court, and the judiciary will decide whether or
not the agency (unconstitutionally) usurped the legislative power.
In the face of the large delegations of power to administrative agencies, where lies the
common law concern about carefully, but necessarily, taking into account in decision-making the
social needs conceptions and concerns of the body politic?
That concern, too, lies within the purview of the administrative agency–within the bounds
of their congressional mandate to be sure.  So agencies, e.g., the SEC, deal not only with what
brokerage houses and investment banks do in fact (their actual conduct), but with what they
ought to do as well (their ethical conduct).
We will deal with specifics in this area in Part II.  There, in the parlance of working
financial managers, we intend to descend from “the view at 50,000 feet,” to some major “on-the-
ground” considerations.
II. The Impact of the Rule of Law on the Ethical Behavior of Securities Industry Firms
As an anonymous participant in financial markets, I never had to weigh the social
consequences of my actions…I felt justified in ignoring them on the grounds that I
was playing by the rules…(this) makes it all the more important that the rules that
govern markets should be properly formulated.  The anonymous participant can
ignore moral, political and social considerations, but if we look at financial
markets from the standpoint of society, we cannot leave such considerations out.
Although we are justified in playing by the rules, we ought to be concerned with
the rules by which we play.11
The preceding quotation from one of the most influential players in world financial
markets raises two issues: Is it true that all participants in U.S. securities markets are “justified”
in playing by the rules even with the knowledge that they are thereby causing social harm?  And
if participants do believe and act upon that “justification,” how then are t ey to manifest their
“concern” about “ignoring moral, political and social considerations” and the social harm they
have caused?  Ought they to lobby legislators to force them to be ethical?
George Soros, the source of the quotation, has actually shown his concern very clearly by
being a very active personal participant in, and major financial contributor to, many socio-
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political endeavors.  Our purpose is not to fault him, but rather to use his quotation as a point of
departure for our on-the-ground look at players and rules in U.S. securities markets.
Subject to the U.S. Rule of Law and consequent regulations, our securities markets with
all their faults are still the largest, most vibrant, most liquid and most admired in the entire world.
One might well argue then, that how and why we formulate and enforce our rules should be of
interest to others beyond our borders.
We begin in opposition to the Soros statement that (in the fiercely competitive struggle
for profits) “playing by the rules” is all that can be asked of any participant.  Or that ethical
behavior beyond the rules will cause the actor to be smashed by others who steer clear of ethical
action.
Our contrary assertion is twofold: first, that any securities market manager who does steer
clear of ethical action is not only headed for serious personal trouble, but may well be taking his
firm, his stockholders, and even the reputation of his industry down with him.  Second, we are
convinced that ethical and socio-political insights and skills should be required of every manager
with authority to act for his firm in securities markets operations.  Such insights and skills are
intimately related to the value of the firm.
Before fleshing out our argument with examples, we note the fact that securities markets
operations encompass a staggering range of activities: stock and bond purchase and sale for retail
customers, wholesale customers, private investors and government entities, underwriting,
investment advising, asset management, investing for the firm’s own account, mergers and
acquisitions, corporate finance, merchant banking and more.  But our focus here will not be on
such individual sets of activities, but rather upon the what, the why and the how of the regulatory
actions which apply singly, or in battalions, to them all.  And our particular emphasis will be
upon the relationship of these actions to ethical behavior.
We begin with an example of business organization crime and punishment.
IIA. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Until very recently, the idea of holding corporations themselves criminally liable for
illegal actions of their employees was subject to much criticism.12  The actual record regarding
corporate conviction for crime shows that, prior to the late 1980s and the 1990s, very few cases
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were even brought to court.  Those that were were targeted at small companies, not larger,
publicly held companies with actively traded stock.13
The situation changed drastically in 1991, the year in which a major governmental tool
for punishing corporations–“Chapter 8”–became the law of the land.  In 1984, Congress passed
The Sentencing Reform Act.14  That law set up a Federal Sentencing Commission charged with
developing guidelines to deal with three basic problems: disparity in sentencing for federal
crimes, uncertainty in sentencing, and an unjust lack of focus on white collar crime.  Some
judges, academics and lawyers were critical of the sentencing law for various reasons,15 but it
was declared constitutional in 1989.16
Initially, the sentencing guidelines did not deal with organizations.  But they went beyond
natural persons, focusing on organizational white collar crime, in 1989 amendments which were
sent to Congress in 1991.  A new chapter was then added to The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Chapter 8: The Sentencing of Organizations.  That chapter, with all of its provisions became
effective on November 1, 1991.17  Now organizations themselves could be held responsible for
violations of any federal law.  There are some 3,000 or so federal laws available for breaking,
involving securities, commercial banking, anti-trust, fraud on the government and many, many
more.
Chapter 8 is evidence of official government recognition of an important ethical reality:
That much of the illegal action of an organization’s employees arises out of the corporate culture
within which they function.  This is the organizational link to white collar crime.
A definition of “corporate culture” is to be found in this organizational statement to its
employees:
Our corporate culture…is the sum total of what we believe and think, how we
work together as colleagues and how we conduct ourselves as individuals.
It is the way we treat our clients, our shareholders, our neighbors and the public
in general.
It is who we are.
And while our corporate culture is by nature indefinable, it begins and ends with
certain principles that underlie our success as a business and as individuals.  Our
future growth and prosperity depend on our continued commitment to these
principles and our ability to instill them in others.18
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The operational market areas covered by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are broad.
Forty-six separate categories of offenses are listed under broad headings; e.g., “commercial
bribery and kickbacks” is one of 6 general offenses listed under “Offenses Involving Property.”
Each offense arises out of a particular area of market operations covered by federal law, as stated
above; e.g. federal securities law.19
And punishments for infractions can be severe.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have two distinguishing characteristics:
1. They provide very specific penalties for specified violations.  Judges must apply these
penalties and no others, unless their reasons for deviation are fully explained and
justified, in writing; e.g., allowed on prosecutor recommendation because of the
unusual extent of cooperation and assistance by the defendant.  There are very few
justifications for departing from the Guidelines.
2. The penalty system for organizations is based upon a government commitment to a
process best referred to as “the carrot and the stick.”  Penalties are adjusted upward or
downward within the mandated categories depending upon a) the steps the
organization has taken, prior to the legal infraction, to avoid criminal conduct, and b)
the cooperation with the government the organization has evidenced once an
infraction has taken place.  Some attention is also given to the involvement or non-
involvement of high level organization personnel in the infraction.
Figure 1 lists offense levels on the left.  They are based on the government’s harm
priorities.  Minor offenses are ranked at 6 or less, more serious ones; e.g., certain anti-trust
offenses can be ranked as high as 38 and above.  The dollar fines are shown in the right hand
column: as little as $5,000 for a minor one, $72,500,000 for a very serious one.
However, because of the carrot and stick approach, embedded in the Guidelines, a level
38 infraction would not be likely to result in exactly $72,500,000.  That figure would probably
be adjusted up or down.
The direction of the adjustment would be determined by several factors, particularly
those set out in paragraph 2 above.  Past infractions of federal law are also taken into
consideration.  All those elements are, together, the basis for what is referred to as the
organizational “culpability score.”  The culpability score ranges from a low fraction up to 4.  If a
corporate crime is at level 38 or above, and the culpability score is at 4, the total fine then would
be $290,000,000, an amount calculated to send a clear and convincing message.
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Figure 1 CORPORATE FINES
Offense Level Amount
6 or less $5,000
7 $7,500
8 $10,000
9 $15,000
10 $20,000
11 $30,000
12 $40,000
13 $60,000
14 $85,000
15 $125,000
16 $175,000
17 $250,000
18 $350,000
19 $500,000
20 $650,000
21 $910,000
22 $1,200,000
23 $1,600,000
24 $2,100,000
25 $2,800,000
26 $3,700,000
27 $4,800,000
28 $6,300,000
29 $8,100,000
30 $10,500,000
31 $13,500,000
32 $17,500,000
33 $22,000,000
34 $28,500,000
35 $36,000,000
36 $45,500,000
37 $57,500,000
38 or more $72,500,000
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Conversely, there are actions the corporation might have taken that would mitigate the
offense level, say down to 28.  Given an insignificant “culpability score,” the total penalty could
be, say $10,000,000 rather than $290,000,000, a rather significant savings.
One major before-the-fact mitigator is the existence within the organization of “an
effective program to prevent and detect violations of the law.”  There are 10 elements that make
up such a program, and they are contained in the Guidelines manual–a publication with which all
corporate compliance officers are intimately acquainted.  The elements encompass compliance
standards and procedure; oversight by high level personnel; due care in delegating authority;
effective communication of the program within the company and steps taken to achieve
compliance–included here is a “reporting system” employees might use without fear of
retaliation; i.e., encourage “whistleblowing!”  There are other elements, but the key is to have the
organizational efforts so focused on prevention and detection as to constitute “due diligence.”20
No organization can be asked to be, or be held to being, crime free.  Neither can 100%
crime free neighborhoods be the charge of a well functioning municipal police force.  Of course,
the government cannot force any private employee into having such a program as described
before the fact.  But after the fact, in addition to the severe, unmitigated penalties that could be
levied against the firm, a program can then be forced upon it.
This brings us to the supreme organizational punishment, not listed in Figure 1.  It is
called “Probation.”  Organizations, in practice, go to very great lengths to avoid it, even agreeing
to pay high dollar fines.  An organization placed on probationary status for serious infractions
will be forced to put “an effective program” in place; could be assigned an overseer appointed by
the government to remain on site for a specified period of time to watch over the new program
and even more general corporate activity; will have to make books and records available to the
government on demand; and held to making all penalty payments in full and on time.
The Guidelines apply to all infractions of federal law subsequent to November 1, 1991
(not before).  They are, to our knowledge, the only such body of law in the world focused on
corporate behavior and calculated to motivate the maintenance of a corporate culture which
actively promotes lawful and ethical behavior.
The word “ethics” does not appear specifically in Chapter 8.  However, on the ground, in
actual practice, government regulators are very much affected by the presence, or the absence, of
a corporate code of ethics which actually provides support for the corporate compliance
program.21  The reason for this practical ethics requirement has been stated succinctly by the co-
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author of the most important legal treatise extant on compliance programs and the organizational
sentencing guidelines:
The dynamic nature of business crime also suggests that no compliance program
can truly be effective if it neglects the broader subject of ethics.  With laws (or the
interpretation of laws) subject to change on little notice, ethical reasoning and
instincts can act as an all-important safety net.  A purely legalistic approach, by
contrast, may ill serve not only ethics, but compliance itself.  A limited approach
may also be unsatisfying to many employees as well as to others in a company’s
community–such as customers.22
One might posit here a hypothetical decision that must be made by a brokerage house
branch manager.  His star performer out there on the line (whose extraordinary production is an
element helping to determine the manager’s bonus) is skating closer and closer to the
“unsuitability” line with several of her major customers; i.e., is putting them into higher fee,
riskier, in-house investments somewhat divergent from their initially stated investment goals.
But they are showing good profits at the moment.
Should the manager pull her up short?  With the exception of clear violations of the
suitability rules, there is nothing on the compliance officers’ list of legal rule-based dos and
don’ts that can satisfactorily make the decision for him.  The manager ought to identify all the
interests at stake here: his, the broker’s, the firms, other brokers who watch how the star operates
and customers whose accounts are being affected.
If “compliance” equals “going by the (present) book,” maybe the firm would not lose a
lawsuit if the market turns on the broker and her customers.  The firm’s argument is clear: these
people knew the risks of the less safe investments with the higher possible payoff.  They only sue
now because they lost their bets and can no longer afford to retire.  We are not legally to blame.
Caveat Emptor.
It could be argued, to the contrary, that we are in fact much closer today to caveat vendor.
Certainly, people given all the necessary and understandable information who choose to gamble
ought to be prepared to lose–in the stock market or in a casino.  But it is also true, apart from
actual legal liability–which may or may not be present in our hypothetical case–that the manager
is involved here with duty to one’s customers, duty to the firm including to its reputation, duty to
this broker and his other brokers as well who may want to skate on the same pond she does.  Let
us further assume that when the manager puts this question to the broker: “Have you explained
Page 14
all the ramifications of these new in-house investments to your clients?” he gets the answer:
“Maybe not every damn thing, but they know there’s greater risk here.  Besides, we aren’t
required by law to discuss our fee structures if they don’t ask, so we don’t have to be concerned
about higher commissions on these products either.”
Presently, compliance officers are usually listed by their firms as “ethics officers,” for
reasons not immediately clear to the office holder who attempts to take that title seriously.  Still,
it is to be hoped that the branch manager in our hypothetical, if in doubt, should have available to
him an ethics officer worthy of the name.
As we shall soon see in our “soft money”; IPO “spinning”; and “clearing operations”
examples, playing by the rules without ethical insight can be dangerous and costly.
But first, a final note on the Sentencing Guidelines.  The Chapter 8 focus on the
organization’s culture and culpability is certainly not meant to derogate in any way from
individual guilt which is covered in the other guideline chapters.  In fact, the danger of
punishment for individuals, as we shall see, has been increas d as one result of Chapter 8!
Figure 2 lists jail-time penalties for individual offenders under the Sentencing Guidelines.
The six columns listed under “Criminal History Category” relate solely to augmentation of
penalties when there have been prior offenses by the defendant.  We will assume here that the
defendant has had one prior offense or none, so we are concerned only with column I.  Then we
shall match up the “offense level,” in the extreme left hand column, with the jail time to be
imposed in column I.
Let us assume an “Insider Trading” conviction.
The Guidelines list that as a level 8 offense.  Therefore, the judge has the authority to
impose no jail time, or up to 6 months behind bars.
However, please examine Figure 3.  All offense levels are augmented by the financial
severity of the crime.  Therefore, in point of fact, the only time an inside trader is sentenced at as
low a level as 8, is if he made less than $2,000 on the transaction—or perhaps l st m ney.23  Let
us assume the lawbreaker made $75,000 using inside information.  (G) in the extreme left hand
column tells us to add 6 to the set 8, and now we have a category 14 crime at (fairly high) “Zone
C.”  A check of Figure 2 makes clear that the defendant now must serve a minimum of 15
months in prison.  And if the profit had been $525,000, the sentencing category would be 18,
which means a mandatory prison sentence of no less than 2 years and 3 months, or even 6
months longer.
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Figure 2 INDIVIDUAL PRISON SENTENCES
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
Offense
Level
I
(0 or 1)
II
(2 or 3)
III
(4, 5, 6)
IV
(7, 8, 9)
V
(10, 11, 12)
VI
(13 or more)
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
Zone A
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
Zone B
10 6-13 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
Zone C
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-86
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-162 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-263 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
Zone D
43 life life life life life life
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The operational word is “mandatory.”
The defendant may be a wonderful parent, scout leader, devout churchgoer and with no
criminal record of any kind–not even a speeding ticket.  And his lawyer may be able to bring to
court a gaggle of witnesses to testify to his otherwise sterling reputation.  All of that is irrelevant.
He will have to serve at least the mandatory minimum.  To that point there is no judicial
discretion.  Maybe this defendant will avoid the maximum in the category, but that is all the hope
there is.
All of which might suggest the helpfulness of an ethical sensitivity before the act.  But if
the impact of government law in these cases is not yet perceived as too serious, we might go
further and point out the following:
Let us assume that an offense level 9 defendant, who made only $4,500 on his “inside”
trade, banked his ill gotten gains, or wrote a check for some legitimate purpose using some or all
of that money.  She has then engaged in a “structured financial transaction” dealing with the
“proceeds of unlawful activity.”
The legal term for that is “money laundering.”
The offense level for money laundering begins at 21.  Add 1 to that, it becomes 22: a
mandatory minimum of over 3 years behind bars.  Not to mention a gain from the original
transaction of $510,000.  That makes 31 and a mandatory minimum of 9 years behind bars.
Remembering always that a federal prosecutor has discretion in deciding whether or not to
actually indict an individual or a corporation, and just which count(s) to charge them on, the
leverage power here is tremendous.  Imagine, if you will, being guilty of insider trading, and a
reasonable (temporary) profit, and being told by the federal prosecutor: “You have 3 choices
here.  Stand tough and be indicted on the counts of insider trading AND money laundering; plead
guilty and we drop the money laundering count; turn in everybody else involved in this insider
deal, and, if they are sufficiently substantial, you get immunity from prosecution.”  Clearly, if
you are one of the “everybody else,” your days outside of jail are numbered.
The reality is that a common occurrence in a prosecutor’s ante room is the presence of
several lawyers and clients at odds about who got there first; i.e., who is entitled to go in first to
the prosecutor and get a deal not helpful to all the others.
The potential severity of penalties for individuals under the current insider trading law
can now be placed upon inside trades with no fiduciary duty to anybody for anything if the trader
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Figure 3 MULTIPLIERS
PART F – OFFENSES INVOLVING FRAUD OR DECEIT
2F1.1 Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of
the United States
2F1.2. Insider Trading
2F1.1 Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of
the United States
(a) Base Offense Level:  6; Insider Trading Base Offense Level: 8
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the loss exceeded $2,000, increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level
(A) $2,000 or less no increase
(B) More than $2,000 add 1
(C) More than $5,000 add 2
(D) More than $10,000 add 3
(E) More than $20,000 add 4
(F) More than $40,000 add 5
(G) More than $70,000 add 6
(H) More than $120,000 add 7
(I) More than $200,000 add 8
(J) More than $350,000 add 9
(K) More than $500,000 add 10
(L) More than $800,000 add 11
(M) More than $1,500,000 add 12
(N) More than $2,500,000 add 13
(O) More than $5,000,000 add 14
(P) More than $10,000,000 add 15
(Q) More than $20,000,000 add 16
(R) More than $40,000,000 add 17
(S) More than $80,000,000 add 18
(2) If the offense involved (A) more than minimal planning, or (B) a scheme to defraud more than one victim, increase by 2 levels.
(3) If the offense involved (A) a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious or
political organization, or a government agency, or (B) violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or
process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines, increase by 2 levels.  If the resulting offense level is less than level 10,
increase to level 10.
(4) If the offense involved (A) the conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury, or (B) possession of a dangerous weapon
(including a firearm) in connection with the offense, increase by 2 levels.  If the resulting offense level is less than level 13,
increase to level 13.
(5) If the offense involved the use of foreign bank accounts or transactions to conceal the true nature or extent of the fraudulent
conduct, and the offense level as determined above is less than level 12, increase to level 12.
(6) If the offense –
(A) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution; or
(B) affected a financial institution and the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense,
increase by 4 levels.  If the resulting offense level is less than level 24, increase to level 24.
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knew, or should have known, that he was using inside information in connection with a tender
offer.24
The severity of the penalties for individuals under the Guidelines places in stark relief the
way in which the Guidelines’ corporate punishments can lead individuals into a trap.  There are
three new actions an organization must take if it hopes to get a substantial mitigation credit from
the government after a crime has been committed: promptly reporting the problem; cooperating
in the investigation; and/or accepting criminal responsibility.  Organizations can, and sometimes
do, accept criminal responsibility outright, pay huge dollar penalties and avoid actual indictment
for a crime.  More often, however, they fully cooperate with the government before accepti g
criminal responsibility in order to have others (employees) shoulder a good part of the blame,
which results in less penalties for them.  The corporate cooperation must include all information
“sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify...the individuals responsible for the
criminal conduct.25  As between the organization and the individual employee, the choice of the
organization is clear enough: the employee is going to take the fall.  In this connection, it is clear
that attorney-client confidentiality may well be waived by the organization, leaving the employee
without that defense in terms of anything he has confided to a company lawyer.  Moreover, in
“cooperating,” the organization, in a sense, has become an investigating arm of the government.
The serious affect on employees has not gone unnoticed.26
Any corporate employee in or out of the securities industry ought to understand the
importance of federal sentencing laws.  And while sensible ethical (fairness) arguments may be
made on either side of the strong prosecutorial leverage issue here, or on an organization’s
willingness to sacrifice its own, one thing is surely clear: The impact of this government law and
regulatory process on the ethical behavior of the firm, its managers and all its employees is
tremendous.
There are clear benefits to a securities firm in avoiding indictment, conviction, heavy
fines and being placed on probation.  But we would suggest that there are good reasons for
emphasizing the long term benefits from creating a “compliance culture” apart from simply
penalty avoidance.  Particularly by making compliance a subset of ethics.  Employees react
positively to an ethics program in which the management leads by example far more positively
than to one which says, in effect: “We are not in business to worry about the moral and social
consequences of our acts.  What we want you to do are two things.  First learn the rules from the
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compliance department and be damn sure not to break them.  Second, meet your bottom line
requirements and how you do it is your responsibility.27
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not the only example of incentives urging
organizations to recognize changing social standards and to take preventive action to avoid harm.
The recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the Equal Employment Opportunity Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, and specifically sexual harassment,28 l id dow  some legal rules
on organizational responsibility.  The two major cases29 made clear that:
· If an employer exercises reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and
· If the employer unreasonably fails to take advantage of these prevention and
correction opportunities,30 and
· If the employer didn’t lose its preventive, corrective program defense by taking some
“tangible employment action” against the employee; e.g., by failing to promote her,
then
the employee cannot recover anything in a sexual harassment lawsuit.
Without such a program in place, the firm is clearly responsible for sexual harassment by
a supervisor, whether it actually knew about it or not.  Having had such a prevention/correction
program in place, before any legal rule required it, saved Wal-Mart Stores a lot of money in a
case in 1997: $4,650,000 dollars to be exact.  A sexual harassment plaintiff’s $5 million punitive
award was cut back to $350,000 on the basis of the defendant’s having had a program in place to
deal with this serious concern.31
IIB. Keeping Up With the Spirit of the Common Law–and Ahead of the Rules: Three Current
Illustrations
1. IPO “Spinning
In the world of Wall Street “spin desks” (as of 1997):
many investment banks silently allocate chunks of hot new stocks to the
personal brokerage accounts they hold for corporate executives and
venture capitalists–“spinnning” or “flipping” the shares on the day of the
IPO for quick profits–in an apparent bid for business from the executive
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firms…‘At its extreme an IPO is priced Wednesday.  Thursday morning
you call 25 venture capitalists and say: “by the way, XYZ just went public
at 15.  It’s now 30.  You just sold your allocation at 29 ½.  I hope you’re
happy.’32
Should this kind of spinning be looked at as a quid proquo?  If so, see the
problem.  The executive who takes the profit has to deal with the issue of breach of
fiduciary duty.  Fiduciary duty posits a very special relationship between principal and
agent.  One aspect is that the fiduciary has an affirmative duty not to profit by virtue of
his position as a fiduciary; another is an affirmative duty to disclose to the principal any
and all information in his possession that bears upon any decision the principal is to
make.  Both duties are not consistent with taking spin money as, say, a chief financial
officer of X Company, or helping to decide on using the spin profits’ investment bank to
underwrite X Company’s new stock issue.33
The “spin” broker’s refrain is, of course, “everybody does it and they always
have.”  Then comes one of society’s message bearers (media) in the form of the Wall
Street Journal.  And the practice is exposed to the light of day for all those in and out of
the game to see–and with easily perceivable distaste.  The “justice, reason and common
sense” of the common law process34 is set in motion.  There are certainly other ways to
get change started, but our media message bearers rank high on the list.
It would be overstating the case to say that spinning is now extinct.  However, the
SEC is now all over the process, and if not abandoned, spinning is down by a
considerable degree.  And those who insist on playing that game are now opened up to
lawsuits.
Many firms who spun and then “flipped” IPO stock for major firms’ officers
(turned it over quickly for a profit) have been preventing lesser customers of the firm,
who manage to get a small piece of an IPO, from “flipping” the very same stock.  The
method used is to inform all of the firm’s brokers that if their regular course of business
customers do not retain their stock for 20 or 30 or whatever days, then the broker loses
his commission on the original sale.
State securities regulators have come down heavily on that one as a “dishonest
and unethical business practice” that puts the firm’s brokers in direct contravention with
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the financial interests of their customers.  Massachusetts regulators have charged
brokerage firms with wrongdoing here and have stated that “requiring firms to abandon
(these) policies is one of the more severe sanctions we will impose.”35
2. “Soft Dollar” Services
Investment managers often get an array of services from many brokerage firms to
whom they give their business.  It has even been estimated that the soft dollar brokerage
business accounts for as much as 40% of all stock trading.36  Soft ollars are certainly not
all unethical.  Some of the higher commissions (soft dollars) paid to brokers result in an
investment manager being provided with valuable extras; e.g., independent research such
as stock reports and data feeds, which do not come automatically with purchase and sale
execution.  That is not a kickback from the broker, rather it is a return for the higher
commission paid.  However, investment managers rarely inform their clients that they are
actually paying higher than normal broker fees, nor, certainly, what they are getting in
return.  A large problem, surely, when the broker returns part of the excess fee; e.g., in
the form of payment for new top-of-the-line furniture for the manager’s office.
The result of public exposure to the soft dollar phenomenon was an 18 month
“sweep” of 250 investment advisors and 7 broker-dealers by the SEC’s Office of
Compliance.  The concern of Chairman Levitt went beyond excessive commission rates
to such areas as the overtrading of accounts, and inferior execution by less efficient
brokers to satisfy a soft dollar obligation.
Subsequent to the compliance report, the SEC moved to tighten up section 28(e)
of the securities laws (which does not prohibit soft dollars per se).  Full disclosure to
clients is the watchword now and, in the case of the $5.5 trillion dollar mutual fund
business, better disclosure to investment advisors’ boards.37
3. Securities “Clearing Firms” and Responsibility For Activities of Their Customers.
We have one last example now of a sea change in securities market processes,
arising not out of formal legal change, but rather out of a changing social concern about
certain types of behavior affecting the investor public.
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Actually, it should be recognized that brokerage firms and investment banks
affect the public welfare, generally, not just the welfare of investing clients.  First,
because they are key to the stability of the financial system which affects us all.  And
secondly because many of them are in the category of too-big-to-be-allowed-to-suffer-
the-consequences-of-their having failed.  Thus have some of these firms been bailed out
of looming catastrophe by the Federal Reserve.  Indeed, it is an article of faith in the
investment community, that they will continue to be bailed out when, and if, financial
markets are broadly threatened, just as commercial banks have been.  It is surely arguable
that the lofty height of the stock markets is not unrelated to a safety net subsidy, and there
is an ethical issue of some significance.
October, 1987 is but one example of this subsidy.  But what is not so commonly
known is that severe constraints on brokerage firm access to the Federal Reserve lending
window were removed by a section of the relatively new FDICIA laws in 1991.38
Further, the brokerage industry’s insurance fund is dependent in the end upon the lenders
of last resort–the taxpayers of the United States–that fund, the SIPC, has a line of credit
with the Treasury Department of hundreds of millions of dollars.  All financial institution
bailouts have, at bottom, the deep pockets of taxpayers.
The last Federal Reserve involvement in a serious market failure in the securities
business involved the hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).  It has been
argued that the Fed’s effort to get LTCM creditors together to bail out LTCM and avoid a
fire sale of its assets that would “distort market prices” and “produce large losses, or
worse for a number of creditors and counterparties”39 involv d no public money.  That
argument is not wholly true.40
The U.S. creditors who stood to lose heavily included U.S. commercial banks
with deposit insurance and securities firms with implicit taxpayer guarantees.  And losses
would hardly have been confined to loans outstanding, either. “It seems almost certain
that banks and securities firms also had significant exposure as counterparties to LCTM’s
sways positions.”41  LTCM had to be saved because, among other things, taxpayer money
was at risk.  If the Federal Reserve is to be thanked for keeping the axe from falling on
us, it should also be asked why it does not insist on some punishment for financial firms
who fail in their duty as “public stewards” as they did here through the extent of their
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questionable investments in a firm which may well have failed because of “arrogance,
avarice and its resulting leverage.”42
In any event, the common law concept of focusing “on broad and comprehensible
principles based on justice, reason and common sense” should give us hope that,
eventually, in the face of safety net subsidies,43 responsibility for the public good may
well be imposed upon those who tend to lose sight of it in the midst of what can be
overzealous wealth maximization practices.
Some clearing firm “activities” can fall in the overzealous category.
Clearing firms are trade processors.  They are large brokerage houses which are
hired by smaller firms (called “introducing brokers”) to execute trades for them, maintain
client records, send out trade confirmations and monthly statements and also settle the
smaller firm’s transactions.  By this clearing firm arrangement, the introducing broker is
able to use the cachet of the powerful, well-known firm, and the powerhouse firm is able
to make a tremendous amount of money.
The clearing firm requires introducing firms to put up a deposit, usually some
$250,000.  It also levies a “ticket charge” of $10 to $25 on each trade it conducts for the
introducing broker.  It also charges interest, usually 1% per month on margin loans it
makes to these customers.44
Since 1982, when commissions were deregulated, clearing firms have not had
legally determined oversight responsibilities for their introducing brokers.  The operating
principle has been to provide the service and earn the money for any introducing broker
who hasn’t yet been thrown out of the business.  The ethical (or even illegal) character of
the still-in-operation introducing firm was not regarded as the business of the clearing
firm in any way.
Then A.R. Baron & Co., an introducing broker to its clearing broker, Bear Stearns
& Co., went bankrupt.  Baron was also charged by the Manhattan (New York City)
District Attorney with being a criminal enterprise that defrauded investors out of $75
million dollars.
Bear Stearns, whose clearing operations represented more than 25 per cent of its
multi-billion dollar business in recent years,45 came under fire in connection with the
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A.R. Baron debacle.  Bear Stearns cleared for Baron in 1995, when Baron’s credit was so
bad it was unable to qualify for a corporate gasoline credit card.  In that same year, Baron
paid $1.5 million in fines in an NASD settlement where it was alleged that it executed
trades for customers at unfair and unreasonable prices.  By the end of that same year,
Baron’s capital fell below the regulatory minimum.  Additionally, a Baron customer
notified Bear Stearns of unauthorized trading in its accounts.  Bear Stearns simply
referred the matter back to Baron.  In October of 1995, Bear Stearns injected $1.1 million
of its own money into A.R. Baron to keep it afloat when its capital once more fell below
the statutory minimum.  The SEC ordered Baron to halt all operations in May, 1996.  It
filed for bankruptcy two months later, and less than a year after that came under formal
investigation by the Manhattan District Attorney.46
By early June of 1997, the NYSE and NASD had their officials meet with several
clearing firm officials.  One firm, Oppenheimer & Co., announced plans to stop
processing trades for any introducing broker client accused by regulators of charging
excess commissions.47  Bear Stearns’ position was that a clearing broker had neither
access to, nor control over, any introducing broker, and if subjected to customer claims,
might well get out of the business altogether.48  The SEC took the position that the Bear
Stearns’ matter was not even an issue about higher clearing standards, that it was “about a
firm that did nothing to stop a fraud and plenty to perpetuate it.”49  The SEC hen let Bear
Stearns know it was preparing to consider making civil securities fraud charges against it
(with attendant Sentencing Guidelines penalties if the U.S. Attorney went further with
criminal charges).  A settlement was reached with Bear Stearns agreeing to pay a fine,
and restitution to A.R. Baron customers of $25 million.  The agreement apparently was
that Bear Stearns “contributed to” A.R. Baron’s activities–something short of “aiding and
abetting” fraud.  Bear Stearn’s senior executive in charge of its billion dollar a year
clearing business later resigned.50
The key question here is not why Wall Street firms would accept no responsibility
for introducing brokers actions for a long time; rather it is how could a major investment
bank fail to see changes blowing in the wind?  Hubris may well be part of the answer.
But an argument could be made that Bear Stearns’ admittedly strong compliance culture
(nobody here is allowed to break the law), did not focus on ethical sensitivity at all.   The
notion that all action still legal is per se ethical and beyond punishment, is not true in fact;
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e.g. Nazi functionaries acted in accordance with then German Law, and is, additionally a
dangerous notion in the face of our common law tradition.
4. The Securities Industry in Cyberspace
We have no ability to predict the future of securities markets in cyberspace.  But
we are able to relate to cyberspace issues giving rise already to questions of law and
regulation.  Our assumption is that the Rule of Law will prevail, even on the Internet.  If
it does not, competitive markets as we know them now will cease to exist, and
meaningful discussions on the issue of securities will be limited to self-defense and
survival.
This is not to say that our basic constitutional values will not take new workable,
practical legal and regulatory shapes that cannot now be foreseen.  But if private property
rights and the sanctity of contracts are to prevail, so must fundamental fairness to the free
citizens of a democracy.  In its absence comes the kind of social concern and even social
upheaval that saps both the spirit and the efficiency of the Republic.  All changes to
fundamental unfairness in our society, whether it be poverty in the midst of plenty or lack
of adequate medical care for tens of millions in a society with the finest medical
procedures in the world–all such challenges bring problems.  There are problems for the
political process, and a great deal of cost to the taxpayer, albeit in indirect ways, and in
some meaningful measure these problems end up adding to the massive workload of the
judicial system.
It is not likely that due process fairness will disappear in cyberspace on the
ground that nobody can be expected to determine and enforce the rights and
responsibilities that ought to exist out there.  “Cyberspace ethics” is not an oxymoron.
Market executives are thinking about this already: It’s interesting that,
right now, even though times are good for most folks on Wall Street, we
face some unique ethical challenges in the stock market…the ethical
requirements of our business are increasing because of the juxtaposition
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of technology and the increased participation in financial markets by the
average American.51
We will focus here on just what those “ethical requirements” ought to be for
securities firms–not on broader cyberspace issues such as where the overall responsibility
should lie for governing the Internet.52
The advent of on line trading has already changed the structure of the securities
industry.  According to recent data, more that 6.3 million U.S. households had on line
trading accounts as of April, 1999.53  On line transactions in 1998 rose from less than 11
percent of total stock trades in the first quarter to 13 percent in the fourth quarter.  Given
that 400 billion shares of stock were traded on U.S. exchanges in 1998, that constitutes a
lot of cyberspace transactions.  And according to the Wall Stre t Journal the top 10
trading firms control over 91 percent of the total business.54
Outside of cyberspace, where almost all of us still live and conduct our business,
there are legal and ethical constructs for promoting proper behavior in broker-client
relations.
All stockbrokers, mainly because of the asymmetry of information that exists
between the buyer and seller of securities, have some form of legal duty to every single
client.  The extent of that legal duty depends on two central factors: the nature of the
service relationship between the parties with regard to the transaction being done, and the
extent of the information asymmetry between them.
A broker receiving a simple buy order from a sophisticated client has a duty to
that client.  But it is limited to the quality of execution only; i.e., proper timing and price.
How that stock performs is the client’s risk, not the broker’s.  At the other end of the
scale is the elderly widow, completely lacking in market experience, who comes to a
broker for advice on how to invest her nest egg which is now $250,000 in bank CDs.
Even here the broker’s duty may not be at the level of fiduciary; however, the broker
better get a lot of information on this widow’s preferences, risk profile, total assets and
the like before making his investment recommendations.  The duty of care here is far
higher than to our first client.  And if the broker is handling a “discretionary” account;
i.e., has full authority to buy and sell for the client’s portfolio according to the broker’s
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best judgement only with no need for permission to make specific trades, then the
broker’s duty is fiduciary, and that is a very high duty indeed.
The Orange County debacle of 1994, which ended up with the collapse of the
county’s investment pool, $l.6 billion in losses, and the largest municipal bankruptcy
filing ever in the United States, is a good example of the seriousness of the broker duty to
its various clients.
Following the bankruptcy, Orange County sued Merrill Lynch, its major
brokerage house, other investment banks, accounting firms and law firms as well.  All the
lawsuits went forward on the same basis: that the defendants did not fulfill their duty to
the county/client to disclose to them fully the nature and extent of the risks to which their
investment pool was being subjected.
Since the investment pool consisted of publicfunds, one issue was whether these
defendants had a higher duty of care than they would have with private investors–clearly
a relationship issue.  The investment manager for the county, it was argued, was less
sophisticated than he pretended to be, and was taken advantage of, for profit.  Merrill
Lynch argued that the manager was very sophisticated and knew exactly what the risks
were.  Who disclosed what to whom, and who fully understood whatever, are questions
of fact for the jury.  For us to pursue them here would be an utter waste of time.
Our interest is in the level of the duty of care owed by Merrill (and the others) to
this particular investor.  If this case had gone to trial, the jury would have had to
determine the truth of who said what, when, how, and what was understood and what
wasn’t.  But only the judge could define the level of care owed to the county by the
defendant.  The jury would have to fitted their found facts to the legal standard of care
defined by the judge.  It would have been interesting to know exactly how that standard
would have been legally defined; however, none of the parties apparently were anxious to
find out.  All the cases were settled.  Merrill Lynch paid $437.1 million to Orange
County, and $30 million more to county criminal authorities to settle their ongoing probe.
All the other defendants settled for a total of $204.1 million.  When all the interest was
added on, the total collected by the county of their $1.6 billion loss, was $860.6 million.55
Whether that final figure represents an ethical conclusion to that sorry matter is a subject
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for a different paper.  The focus for us is the importance of determining the nature of the
legal duty owed in these and similar broker-customer securities matters.
Including those arising out of transactions in cyberspace.  The determination of
the nature of rights and duties on line, under our Rule of Law, will depend on preserving
the public trust in, and commitment to, the good health and growth of securities markets,
whatever may be the technological parameters.
It is clear enough that securities markets transactions in the 21st century will take
place on a playing field far different from the one with which the 20th century has been
familiar.
“On line” trading is a coverall term for securities (and soon enough, debt paper)
transactions entered into and completed on the Internet using computer processes.  Some
customers trade on the Internet much as they would on the ground: with a broker’s
advice, or data provided by her or her firm, with an eye toward risk tolerance, present
financial position, ultimate investment goals, and some substantive information on the
companies in which they invest.
Then there are “day traders,” whose goal is immediate profit.  They often know
nothing at all about the company whose shares they buy and sell, other than the direction
in which they and their industry as a whole perhaps have been moving.  And trading as
they do several times in a day, they may well lose sight of their current financial position.
Prior to 1997, technological inefficiencies in the market had provided
opportunities only for fast acting professionals in possession of equipment and access to
data, with the opportunity for rapid daily profits.  Then came the NASDAQ collusive,
point spread scandal which had two important results.  First, the many brokerage firms
allegedly involved in maintaining wider point spreads in order to heighten profits, paid
out more than $1 billion in settlements.  More important, new NASDAQ Trading Rules
were put into effect, providing greater data access to non-professionals through more
prominent display of their stock orders on the NASDAQ system.  Day trading could now
become a game for everyone.
There are those who argue that day trading is indeed a fine example of financial
democracy at its best.  That given the existence of so many powerful computers and
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relevant software programs in the hands of the ordinary investor, the mechanics of the
day trading game are now the same for everyone.
There are two basic ways to day trade: from home, mainly in association with a
firm that maintains high speed access lines for day trader use, or perhaps a mainstream on
line brokerage house whose executions usually take longer than a singularly focused high
speed day trading firm.  The second way to day trade is to use the office of a day trading
firm to transact your personal business.  These firms have the computers and the Internet
connections, let customers trade for themselves, and take their commission on each
transaction.  The head of the Electronic Traders Association has been quoted as saying
that there are 70 such day trading offices located throughout the United States where
some 3000 to 4000 persons come each day to participate in the game.56
Both at-home and at-the-office day traders may well be in and out of stock
positions several times a day and, apparently, most of them lose money.57  Clearly, day
traders do not constitute the major portion of all on line trading, and abuses in the
practice do seem to be exposed more or less quickly.  Some of these abuses include:
enticing the gullible with false and/or deceptive advertising which does not mention the
enormous risks present in this game; illegal margin loans which bypass margin limits set
by the Federal Reserve, either by loans from the day trading firm itself or, more often, the
firm arranging for trader-trader loans to keep one trader’s position active though that
position may indicate leverage of 90%–or more.  Traders who lend, at a potentially
profitable percentage, to needy fellow traders are most often not aware that a) they are
taking a very grave risk since, if the fellow trader loses, so do they, and b) that they are
usually breaking the law.
State regulators have taken the lead in dealing with these problems, as well as the
concern that there is improper screening of customers to determine their level of
knowledge, and skills, in order to determine their capacities for playing the day trading
game.58  The NASD is the national self-regulating organization for most of the day
trading firms, and has proposed that all new customers be adequately screened.  The
SEC, meanwhile, is conducting examinations of day trading firms to assess their
compliance with securities laws and regulations.59  In addition, the media, society’s
message bearers, have focused well and often on the day trading phenomenon and its
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abuses, to be followed up fully, one can hope, by lawmakers and regulators.  If, as many
believe, there is a NASDAQ (and, correspondingly, Dow Jones) bubble in the making,
when it bursts, many day traders will suffer losses they deserve to pay.  But other market
investors might well be hurt in the event, lawsuits will proliferate and, overall financial
market efficiency may be negatively affected.  There are many true professionals who are
much concerned about the situation, in particular,
that the volatile mixture of high priced Internet stocks, novice investors
and buying on margin is so combustible that a shock could spread quickly,
through the rest of the market, ruining some investors and jeopardizing
the health of some smaller firms…(and) it could also shake the confidence
of a generation of fledgling investors…60
Others disagree.  While admitting that there is a bubble and it will burst, one Wall
Street guru has argued that nevertheless there is a good side to “the voracious appetite for
Net stocks” in that they have funneled billions in investment capital into the industry and
have maintained the U.S. world leadership in technology.  Moreover, he argues, “it is not
credible to argue that (day trading) activity poses systemic risk for our markets or our
economy.”61
Of course, severe losses, even to some who are innocent of promoting bubbles,
can occur without system breakdown.  Any ethical judgement here would clearly depend
upon the recognition of all interests at stake and an honest weighing of them in
determining how best to proceed, in law and regulation, with day trading and all other
manifestations of on line securities transactions.
What is certain is that Internet trading has already made substantial changes in
securities markets as we have known them, and that many more are yet to come.
Some of Wall Street’s largest and most experienced investment banking houses
are moving into Internet operations.  They have no choice but to engage in competition
with those who can offer ease of access and lower costs through Internet utilization.
Merrill Lynch is in the game already.62  And the competition in trading costs is
challenging older methods of broker compensation; e.g., trade-by-trade commissions.
Middlemen brokers who wish to maintain high fee structures will have to find ways of
delivering value added services, or find themselves unemployed.  Now, even apart from
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Internet transactions, per trade commissions are giving way to low cost single trades and
“asset based advisory fees.”63
Lower transaction costs and more efficient trading action are, indeed, positive
developments brought on by technology and creative imagination.  We are still left,
however, with the important issue of what ought to be seller-buyer duties and
responsibilities in cyberspace transactions.  There are, overall, regulatory concerns
involving regulator technological sophistication, and manpower and money shortages
regarding the enforcement of legal duties.  We will return to this problem in Section III.
There are already new on line complexities; e.g., who has which duties to uphold in the
policing of on line, trading related “chat rooms?”  And higher level, old, on the ground
concerns such as “pump and dump” operations,64 and how poor executions can best be
dealt with.65
The greatest current pending problem (1999) could well be: To what degree of
legal duty must an Internet seller be held in terms of “knowing” its customer?  The New
York Stock Exchange requires that brokers know their clients’ overall goals, risk
preferences and time horizon before they execute an order, whether they recommend the
particular transaction or they do not.  This is referred to as the “suitability” rule.  NASD
holds brokers firmly to a suitability rule when the seller has recommended the
transaction, and is considering enlarging the duty to all transactions in cyberspace.  To
what level of legal duty, exactly, should an on line broker, lacking the normal on the
ground client relationship, be held?  How well can a seller here “know” the client in
terms of what is suitable for her?  How about old-line brokers operating in cyberspace as
well?  Is their level of duty different?
A sizeable percentage of arbitration cases in which customer-buyers prevail are
based presently on “unsuitable” investment grounds.  In the face of any meaningful
market retreat, the ethical and legal issues of “knowing and “suitability” could bring
about an intolerable load of damage claims.
It is difficult to contemplate a brokerage firm of any kind making money for
themselves in the absence of any duty to act in their clients’ best interests and in an
informed fashion.  But exactly what should regulators require?  That on line brokers who
open an account ask the kind of questions that illuminate a would be trader’s investment
Page 32
experience and skills before executing any trade?  Or set up flashing computer warnings
about certain kinds of investing being dangerous to one’s financial health?
No broker, in or out of cyberspace, can or should ever be held to a duty to
guarantee profits or avoid all losses.  Dispensing with all buyer responsibility for his
actions would sink our securities markets–and clearly be unethical in any case.  Yet is it
not outrageous (and publicly unacceptable) to advance the argument that on line duties,
and the oversight duty to enforce them, is just too difficult in cyberspace to allow for any
seller concern about customers committing financial suicide?66
The problem here will be compounded by the reality that stock exchanges
themselves are in the process of changing their firms–and possibly their responsibilities.
We have reached the stage where a three year old computerized stock trading service (an
ECN or “electronic trading network”) has applied to the SEC to become a brand new
stock exchange.67  And many other ECNs are waiting in the wings to apply as well.  The
SEC is studying the issue, but could well grant such an application.  In 1999, the SEC
rule referred to as “Reg ATS” took effect.  It allows alternative trading systems to
become stock exchanges.  That regulation is focused on the probability that ECNs would
be good for market efficiency by dint of rapid innovation and lowered transaction costs.
How should these cyberspace stock exchanges be regulated?  And by whom?
Themselves as self-regulating organizations?  To what duties must they hold themselves?
SEC market regulators know the truth of one market exchange expert’s recent remark:
This is not a revolution.
It’s an earthquake.68
In the face of technology developing exponentially how does one keep one’s legal
and ethical bearings?  The editor of a Wall Street magazine put the problem somewhat in
perspective:
Regulators are having as tough a time as everybody else trying to figure
out what their new priorities should be.  We all need to move more
carefully–There’s too much at stake, from the livelihood of market makers
to the health of the nation’s economy.69
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We will discuss confusing priorities in greater detail in Section III.  For now, we
would conclude by pointing out that the three major established exchanges (NASDAQ
and the American Stock Exchange being combined, however) are not unaware of the
challenges they are facing.  Since ECN financial ownership, currently, comes from
sources dependent on NYSE listing and liquidity, that exchange is less immediately
threatened than NASDAQ-ASE.  Nevertheless, the NYSE is seriously contemplating
becoming a for profit company selling its own shares to the public.  Their focus is on
removing the existing, entrenched power structure which holds back change, and creating
a sizeable pool of funds (with which to buy ECNs themselves, perhaps).  The NASD is
also contemplating spinning NASDAQ off as private for profit company and selling
shares to the public as well.70
Legislators and regulators seeking to ensure the continued development of the
wealth creating function on the one hand, and the fairness and integrity and safety of the
markets on the other are faced with a formidable task in a cyberspace with, as yet,
indefinable dimensions.
And what weight should the best interests of taxpayers play in decision-making
here?  It is they who would pay for picking up the pieces in the case of market failure,
and the vast majority of them would never have played in the game, or actually
understood just what it was.
III. Problems–and Opportunities–In Government Regulation of the Securities Industry
In the U.S. securities industry, where technological advances and risk taking
entrepreneurial activity proceed at a pace far ahead of that of any other nation in the world, the
regulatory burden is a heavy one.  In this section, we intend to approach some overall
considerations our securities industry and its regulators must face to carry that burden
successfully.
We will not consider specific, existing instruments such as derivatives or securities
representing previously untraded assets.  And we note here our omission of the issue of
globalization of securities markets.  We recognize that capital mobility “has all but erased the
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line between the domestic and international financial systems” in many transactional areas.71
Worldwide market connectedness, as we have been reminded through financial crises in other
nations, is important.72  But these realities do not make a focus on keeping our own house in
order unimportant.  We would argue that how we in the U.S. innovate and regulate will not only
be key to the health of our own financial system, but to all others in the world as well.
We begin with a listing of the three general, but crucial, considerations that relate to the
coming regulatory task:
1. Technology driven market change has outrun our capacity to comprehend fully the
meaning of what has already happened in our securities markets, much less what
ought to be happening in the future;
2. We face great difficulties in doing cost benefit analysis regarding individual
regulations in the presence of conflicts between efficient market and democratic
values being measured in a puzzling present and in the face of an undetermined
future.
3. We must continue to deal with the reality of both politician and regulator conflict of
interest, and self-regulating organization conflicts as well.
To begin at the beginning: While our regulators do not truly understand the present or
future state of securities markets, they must act as if they really did.  Questions of fairness,
efficiency and safety must be faced since, every day, trillions of dollars, marks, pounds, euros,
francs, yen and such continue to change hands in various ways all around the world with some
effect, surely, on “the public interest.”  And in the presence of tremendous numbers of players
who feel justified in arguing that public interest is irrelevant to them on the ground that they are
playing by the existing rules.
The answer is bound to be advanced: Why worry about regulation, when we can more
efficiently leave it to the market to decide what’s sustainable and what isn’t?
Prosperity from free enterprise growth has no need for government…controls.
The market itself is the most effective regulator of resources.73
Assisted in times of crisis by lenders of last resort who are, of course, “the government.”
One need not rely just on the academic definitions of market failure: instability (lag time and
perverse reactions); misallocation of resources (monopolies, public goods, externalities and
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informational deficiencies)–and all the rest.74  Beyond the S&L fiasco, and the LTCM debacle in
our own country, it has been well pointed out that 80 to 100 countries have faced financial and
currency crises since the mid 1970s, 69 of them banking crises.  And that does not include
transition economics, which would add 20 countries more – clear “evidence of the importance of
market failures.”75
How, then, to proceed realistically in the whirlwind?  We suggest utilizing a sensible
general approach to working in the face of uncertainty:76 r gulators ought first to examine where
current securities markets changes appear to be taking us.
In the direction of rapid institutional and product development, and diffused delivery
systems, surely.  These create unique opportunities for creating wealth–and for increasing
worldwide competition and ever increasing risk.
Fragmented securities markets, say ECNs, must surely point regulators in the direction of
“conflicts of interest.”  Best execution and best price, for example, from a brokerage house
owned ECN, may not be forthcoming.  That, perhaps, emphasizes the need to consider “which
entities should be allowed to own which others” equally with “how best to police conflicts of
interests in an unfettered ownership market.”  One might answer that there’s no need to worry
about exchange operators since self-regulating organizations and the market itself will take care
of all serious funny business.  That answer represents, at best, the triumph of hope over
experience.  A case in point: The NASDAQ point spread, billion dollar scandal.  Securities
markets failures do not much help to promote our enviable U.S. “equity culture” that can be
counted on in both good and not so good times.77  One might also ask whether a publicly owned
NYSE, with self-regulating powers, could be truly dependable and fair to all customers in the
face of the Wall Street imperative to make as much money for its owners, right now, as possible
without breaking current law?78
A useful approach to rule making in the midst of an uncertain future would seem to be to
deal meaningfully with the question: What kind of future do we prefer?  Perhaps that is
oversimplification.  However, wherever we’re headed, we seem to be travelling there very fast.
We would submit that it’s less than sensible to make such a speedy trip in ignorance of the
destination.  We might also want to examine what we do have now in our possession which
might help us do our job?  That is, What’s our leverage here?
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Our answer would be our constitutional value system and its concomitant Rule of Law.
Among other things, these serve to assure the citizenry that free competitive markets, which
certainly encourage wealth creation and personal material well being, encourage liberty and
democracy as well.  Our trump card is an established culture of public interest protection and it
has surely served us well.  Other nations around the world, anxious to encourage public trust in
their financial institutions, are hard at work trying to understand and emulate that established
culture.  It won’t be easy for them.  We must never abandon our value system, not in the face of
uncertainty, or even in the service of rapid wealth creation, either.  It is our starting point for
decision making in the face of uncertainty.
Of course, we must continue to face the reality of conflicting values.  One way to do that
is to consider cost-benefit analysis.  What in fact is the cost of regulating a particular aspect of
our commercial and/or public life?
It would be hard to argue against the reality that regulation, in some instances, even in the
service of prized values; e.g., clean air, can cost more in some instances than no regulation at
all.79  It would be equally hard, however, to argue against the proposition that effective rules
governing securities regulation are “essential to our equity culture”;80 or that a strong Rule of
Law means better markets,81 or that the character and quality of legal rules and law enforcement
relate directly to the positive development of capital markets;82 or that recent financial disasters
around the world; e.g., Russia, do drive home the reality that law and regulation supported by the
people is one central determinant of progress and the lack of them conducive to destructive
instability.83
Consideration of the costs and benefits of having very little law and regulation of markets
demands a close examination of risks in current markets and the direction in which they are
going.  Some truly disturbing examples of the existence of too much risk are the failure of
LTCM; the uninsured loan for $1.4 billion made by Bank of America to a hedge fund with which
it formed a joint trading venture, and which resulted in some $900 million in losses;84 the
horrendous losses of Metallgesselschaft and Barings PLC; 85 the Sumitomo copper trading losses
of $2.6 billion and the consequent $25 million in fines paid by Merrill Lynch to the London
Metal Exchange and the U.S. CFTC for “aiding and abetting” a client’s improper trading in the
affair.86
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The excuse that no amount of risk assessment and internal action could avoid huge losses
caused by a determined “rogue broker” are just untrue in the face of the facts.  Internal risk
assessment failures in every highly publicized case have been detailed, and show that all the
“victim” firms failed to do what they should have to avoid their deadly problems.87  While these
examples may, indeed, demonstrate regulatory failures as well, they hardly support a cost benefit
argument that rather than expend regulatory dollars, these market players should be left to their
own devices.
A joint SEC, NYSE and NASD Task Force, after having made on-site examinations over
a period of several years, issued a July, 1999 report sharply critical of brokerage firm risk
management in terms of poor supervisory structures, inconsistent use of data and employment of
inappropriate risk measurement tools.88
We are aware of the existence of many self-defeating regulatory strategies such as
inappropriate use of the command-and-control approach and clearly excessive expenditures that
could have been avoided by determinable cost benefit analysis; e.g., the $632 billion spent on
pollution control between 1972 and 1985.89  Nevertheless, costs and benefits are not so clearly
determinable in the case of valuing “risk” properly, and certainly valuing “continued confidence”
in securities markets, whether the regulatory focus be on derivatives, capital requirements for
securities firms90 or insider trading.  We would risk erring on the side of regulatory action and
proper expenditure, investor confidence, and less reliance on the use of the court system to
redress market failures.
The leverage necessary for firm regulatory guidance in the public interest is threatened by
the high inefficiency and unfairness costs imposed on the regulatory process by both
questionable politics at the lawmaker level, regulator conflicts of interest and self-regulating
organization turf wars.
A refusal by legislators to pass effective enabling legislation and/or to fail to authorize
and then appropriate sufficient funds to allow regulatory bodies to do their jobs is an ever-
present concern.  Legislators may do these things out of determined political beliefs, which is
their right and obligation.  However, it all too often appears that these refusals to pass laws and
failures to authorize funding for regulators is uncomfortably connected to politicians’ sources of
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campaign funding.  Proper regulatory leverage must unfortunately take cognizance of the
problem of lobbyists, PACs and much criticized forms of campaign financing.91
This reality encourages a regulatory concern raised by advocates of an economic theory
which holds that regulations are the result of private parties seeking their own personal benefit or
the deprivation of benefits to others.  Regulation in this view is solely the result of self-interest
and disparities in political influence.92
Clearly, some regulation (or lack of it) springs from that source.  Clearly some regulation
does not.  Two good examples would be the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 8, and the
Toxic Release Inventory which requires the annual filing by corporations of toxic chemicals
released into the air by their operations.  The Inventory not only passed despite enormous
industry opposition, it was denounced by the President himself.93
Regulations are often judged as self-serving by citing their consequences.  As others have
pointed out, that is simply bad social science.  What is necessary to any argument into the origin
of legislation “is careful investigation into the actual forces which led to specific legislation (and)
regulation (and) such investigations are infrequent.”94
Substantive change in our campaign financing laws has proved to be a non-starter in a
self-interested Congress.  More regulator and public cooperation supported by a responsible
media might help to alert the public of the dangers to them of legislative inactivity.  And an alert
and caring public is the only real antidote to legislator self interest.
Of course, to rally regulatory bodies and regulators to a cause means getting past their
own conflicts of interest.
To state that in the SEC no regulators are truly motivated to act in the public interest
would not be simply insulting, but preposterous as well.95
Yet to deny any regulator misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance and the lack of
ethical behavior those would indicate, would be ingenuous at best.  How regulators themselves
might be more effectively and efficiently monitored and, when necessary, disciplined, is a
subject demanding serious analysis.  Insights into how best to align regulatory incentives with
those of taxpayers are clearly needed.  Failures in effective commercial banking legislation
connected to the S&L disaster gives support to financial agency theory that would connect
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taxpayer losses to unresolved conflicts of interest between government regulators (and
politicians) and the taxpayers.96
Professor Kane suggests that whether we focus on high paying jobs awarded to regulators
as soon as they leave the regulatory body, or any other manifestation of conflict of interest, news
organizations and academic researchers could do much to improve the “intellectual level of
public debate about financial supervision and regulation in the United States…(since it) is
embarrassingly low.”97
To the government regulator conflict of interest must be added another problem
hampering safety and efficiency, and that is institutional infighting.
Turf battles, overlap, and duplication remain under scrutiny, with an SEC task
force considering how to improve relations with self-regulatory organizations,
such as the National Association of Securities Dealers; criminal authorities;
states, and other agencies.98
The SEC and the Chicago Board of Trade fought a bitter battle over the issue of whether to allow
CBOT offerings of futures contracts based on the Dow Jones utilities and transportation stock
indexes.  The CBOT’s fight was to gain parity with the Chicago Board Options Exchange and
Japanese and Australian and other foreign futures markets.  The SEC’s expressed concern was
focused on possible conflicts of interest.  A 3 judge panel found in favor of CBOT expansion.99
States, too, may begin to encourage financial institutions to spread their wings and fly
beyond the federal regulator playing field.  The Governor of New York has proposed a bill to his
legislature that would alter the state’s banking charter.  Firms would be able to do commercial
banking, and to underwrite and sell insurance and securities.  This would be good for the new
Citicorp-Travelers combination which faces mandated divestitures under Federal Reserve
oversight.  And giant investment banks could conduct retail banking operations through an
affiliated thrift charter.  Of course, commercial banks would have to give up their federal
charters and we would see a shift in primary regulators.100
Finally, self-regulating organizations have, of late, shown disturbing weaknesses.  In
addition to the NASD lapse in connection with the billion dollar NASDAQ point spread scandal,
1999 saw the securities industry’s number one SRO–the New York Stock Exchange–publicly
chastised for oversight failures.  What the NYSE missed was the existence of illegal trading on
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the floor of the exchange.  Floor brokers executing orders in an account, were allegedly sharing
profits from that account as well.  Four NYSE floor brokers also pleaded guilty in a federal court
to a conspiracy to place trades to benefit themselves and not their customers.  The result of an
SEC investigation was the institution, by the NYSE, of several new regulatory initiatives,
including a system that will enable the exchange to reconstruct any trade or cancelled trade from
beginning to end.101
It does not belittle the generally careful and laudable oversight of the NYSE and the
NASD, to note the possibility that when oversight problems do arise, they could be related to an
overly protective watcher stance with a bit too much regard paid to the interests of the watched
rather than their customers.  Some traders even alleged that the NYSE had known for some time
that some brokers were sharing profits with a client and had let the matter pass.102  One wonders
whether stock exchange SROs will become stronger or weaker in their oversight duties when
(and if) they become an arm of a profit making institution.103
The Federal Reserve and the SEC began a battle over the issue of commercial bank loan
loss allowances in the fall of 1998.  The SEC, while engaged in its ongoing initiative to address
the problem of earnings manipulation in a number of industries, became critical of some banks’
loan loss reserve practices.  One banking organization was ordered to reduce its reserves by $100
million, and other banks became concerned.  So did the Federal Reserve which had determined
that issue for the banks in its charge on the basis of what it perceived as best for safety and
soundness.
A Joint Working Group of banking agencies and the SEC was formed to deal with the
issue of correlating safety and soundness requirements with financial statement and report
earnings transparency.104  The resolution seems to make good sense; however, it is a bit
unsettling to see the two major financial system regulators going head to head on a serious public
interest issue.
Should the Glass Steagall law establishing commercial bank/investment bank separation
be repealed, one concern must be who will regulate whom, and why?  This is as much a socio-
political matter as it is a purely regulatory one.  One can only hope that the best interests of the
public will be the legislative goal.  And that any input from the regulatory leadership will not
focus primarily on their own turf interests or on the interest of their charges, the commercial
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banks and the investment banks and brokerage firms.  Rather they should respond in the interests
of their principals, the people.
IV. A Somewhat Broader Conclusion
Financial markets will surely merit the attention of government regulation and law in the
new century now almost upon us.  We have attempted in this paper to delineate some of the legal
and ethical issues raised by financial market activities and those institutions with oversight of
them.  But we would end this paper with a broader reflection on the essential role government
will have to play in the ethical behavior of corporations in the immediate decade to come.
We must focus very clearly and very soon on the many complex issues raised by the
coming of the genetic revolution.  Many free competitive markets, financial markets certainly
being among them, will be involved in such activities as genetic testing for predisposition to
serious illnesses, gene therapy, and genetic engineering encompassing everything from the
choice of physical and perhaps mental characteristics of one’s offspring, to the act of cloning
humans.  Finance and economics, science and religion will demand policy decisions affecting
these markets which will require a kind of involvement of law and regulation beyond anything
ever dreamed of as little as 50 years ago.
How we as a society resolve the ethical “ought tos” (and ought not tos) involved in
coming markets could go very far indeed in determining not just the financial and economic, but
the moral shape of humanity as well in the 21st century and beyond.
Surely we all have to hope that the lawmakers, regulators and corporate leaders involved
in all of these 21st century markets will be represented by men and women with ethical
sensitivities of the highest order.  And with the will and the skill to incorporate them into their
market and oversight actions, and in the public interest.
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